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 HOW PETTY IS PETTY CORRUPTION? EVIDENCE FROM FIRM SURVEYS IN AFRICA 
Abstract 
Recent firm-level surveys suggest that petty corruption is a serious problem for African firms, 
costing the average firm in many countries between 2.5 and 4.5 percent of sales.  However, a 
minor difference in the way firms answer the question has a large effect on estimates of the size 
of the burden.  On average, firms report payments that are between four and fifteen times higher 
when they report them as a percent of sales than when they report them in monetary terms.  This 
paper discusses several possible reasons why there might be a difference including outliers, 
differences between firms that report bribes in monetary terms and firms that report them as a 
percent of sales, and the sensitivity of the corruption question.  But none of these explanations 
explain the discrepancy.  One plausible remaining reason is that firm managers overestimate 
bribes when they report them in percentage terms.  If this is the case, petty corruption might be 
far less costly than the raw data suggest. 
 
 2 
I. Introduction 
How much does petty corruption—payments to government inspectors and bureaucrats to 
either avoid having to comply with government rules and regulations or to get licenses, utility 
connections and fulfill other government requirements more easily or quickly—cost firms in 
Sub-Saharan Africa?  In surveys done in 2006/07, the average firm reported that bribe payments 
were equal to between 2.5 and 4.5 percent of sales in most low-income countries in the region 
(see Table 1).
1
  Although this might not seem very much, it looks higher when compared to other 
costs.  If these estimates are accurate, petty corruption costs the average manufacturing firm in 
most of these countries more than communications (telephone, fax, and Internet) or 
transportation (excluding fuel), about 30 to 80 percent of the cost of fuel and power, and about 
10 and 20 percent of the cost of labor.  These amounts are therefore not inconsequential.  
Moreover, because lying and non-responses are likely to bias estimates downwards, the actual 
cost is likely to be even be higher. 
But are these estimates accurate?  The results from this paper show that the way that 
firms answer the question appears to have a large effect on estimated bribe payments and that, as 
a result, the cost of petty corruption might be significantly lower than this.    In the World Banks‘ 
Enterprise Surveys, firms are able to answer the questions either as a percent of the firm‘s sales 
or in local currency.  As discussed in detail in this paper, firms that answer the question as a 
percent of sales appear to consistently report far higher bribe payments—between four and 
fifteen times higher—than firms that report payments in local currency.  
Observing a difference does not however tell us why this is the case or give us much idea 
about whether one approach is more accurate than the other.  This paper looks at several possible 
reasons why the estimates might be so different—outliers, the way the question is asked, and 
differences between the firms that answer the question as a percent of sales and those that answer 
in local currency.  None of these, however, appear to explain the difference.  One remaining 
explanation is that firm managers that answer as a percentage overestimate the amount they pay.  
If this is the case, petty corruption might cost firms far less than the headline numbers suggest.  
The concern of this paper is simply the monetary cost of petty corruption—not other 
distortions associated with corruption, which might still be significant, nor on other types of 
corruption (i.e., grand corruption) that also might be problematic.
2
  That said, it seems reasonable 
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to expect that the distortions associated with petty corruption are at least partly affected by how 
much petty corruption costs firms.  That is, firms‘ decisions would be more likely to be affected 
by bribe demands when those demands are greater.  In addition, since the questions are asked 
similarly in Enterprise Surveys in other regions, it is likely that responses in these countries are 
affected in the same way as responses in Africa and therefore it is possible that this does not have 
a significant impact on countries‘ relative rankings. 
II. Asking firms about corruption 
Many measures of corruption are based upon managers‘ or experts‘ opinions of either 
how widespread corruption is or the extent to which it has an impact on firm operations. 
Although perception-based measures provide useful information, it is difficult to aggregate 
perceptions across firms when managers have different ideas about how great a problem 
corruption is.  For example, is one major and one minor obstacle greater or less than two 
moderate obstacles in terms of a problem?  It is also difficult to translate opinions into monetary 
costs and therefore to compare the cost of corruption with other costs (e.g., due to inefficient 
regulation, high taxes, or poor infrastructure).  Finally, cultural differences can make it difficult 
to compare responses across countries and to compare the cost of corruption with other costs 
within countries.
3
  Because of these concerns, researchers have tried various approaches to 
quantify the cost of corruption.   
Although it is difficult to quantify some types of corruption, petty corruption—payments 
to government inspectors and bureaucrats to either avoid having to comply with government 
regulations or to get licenses, utility connections and fulfill other government requirements more 
easily or quickly—could be measured directly.  That is, like other costs, firms could document 
the bribes that they pay and report them to interested researchers.  As well as providing a more 
objective indicator of the extent of corruption, this allows researchers to see what types of firms 
and households are more likely to pay bribes and that pay more in bribes. 
Of course, it is unlikely to be this easy.  When respondents are asked questions about 
illegal or immoral behavior, they are often less than forthcoming (Azfar and Murrell, 
forthcoming; Fowler, 1995; Iarossi, 2006).  Because bribing government officials is illegal and 
morally ambiguous in most countries, managers might not be willing to admit to paying bribes—
especially if doing so would open them up to being arrested.   
 4 
There are several techniques to encourage firm managers to candidly answer questions on 
immoral and illegal behavior.
4
  Although the World Bank‘s Enterprise Surveys—the surveys 
used in the analysis in this paper—do not use the most sophisticated techniques to illicit honest 
responses to sensitive questions, such as randomized questions, questions about petty corruption 
are generally phrased in ways that allows respondents to answer without admitting that they pay 
bribes.  For example, the question used in this paper is ―we‘ve heard that establishments are 
sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to get things done with 
regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc.  On average, what percentage of total 
annual sales, or estimated annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal 
payments/gifts to public officials for this purpose?‖5 
Despite these efforts, lying and non-responses are likely to remain a problem—with both 
likely to bias estimates downwards.
6
  Based upon a survey of businesses in Romania, Azfar and 
Murrell (forthcoming) estimate that the percent of firms paying bribes might be one-third or 
more greater if all firm managers answered questions truthfully.
7
   
But other differences also appear to affect responses.  In most of the early Enterprise 
Surveys (before 2006), respondents were required to answer the question as a percent of sales.  
In the more recent surveys (2006 and later), firm managers have been able to choose how to 
respond to the question—either as percent of sales or in monetary terms.  In practice, most 
enterprise managers in Sub-Saharan Africa answer this question as a percentage of sales—the 
first option on the questionnaire.  It is not clear whether this is due to managers‘ preferences, 
interviewers‘ preferences, the phrasing of the question, or the arrangement of the questionnaire. 
In theory, this should not affect results. Firms that answer the question as a percent of 
sales could calculate bribes as a percent of sales by first estimating them in monetary terms and 
then dividing this amount by sales, either implicitly or explicitly. If they took the estimate from 
their firm‘s accounts, this would probably be the most natural way to estimate the amount as a 
percent of sales.   
In practice, estimates of bribes are not usually taken directly from the firms‘ accounts.  
Even if the firm did keep detailed accounts that clearly listed the bribes that it paid, it seems 
unlikely that the manager would be willing to share this information with an interviewer.  
Moreover, the question is phrased about ‗firms like yours‘ rather than the actual firm‘s costs.  
 5 
Since this is done to maintain deniability (i.e., to allow the manager to talk about other firms not 
their own), opening the books would shatter this illusion.   
But even if the numbers don‘t come from their books, managers could still explicitly 
calculate this number (e.g., using a calculator or pencil and paper). During field interviews, 
however, most managers do not do this.  One possible reason is that managers are often 
uncomfortable when asked questions about corruption and bribes.  As a result, they often—
although not always—choose to estimate the number in their head.  Indeed, given that they can 
answer in monetary terms, it is not clear that why they would answer this question as a percent of 
sales if they were to do it in this way. 
Although it seems that it should not matter whether the firm manager answers in terms of 
percent of sales or in local currency, there is evidence that it does.    For firm managers that 
reported that firms like theirs paid bribes and chose to report the amount as a percent of sales, the 
average amount reported in most countries was between about 4 and 8 percent of sales (see Table 
2).  For firm managers that reported in terms of local currency, the average amount reported was 
mostly between about 0.5 and 1 percent of sales.
8
  In countries where at least five enterprises 
reported the amount in percentages and at least five in monetary terms, the difference is 
statistically significant at a five percent level or higher. 
III. Why do firms that report bribes as percent of sales report paying more? 
So why do firms that report bribes as percentages rather than as amounts report higher 
bribes?  There are several plausible answers including: (i) outliers; (ii) difficulty of answering 
questions for ‗firms like yours‘; and (iii) firms that pay more in bribes might be more likely to 
answer in terms of percentages.  In this section, we look at each of these explanations to see 
whether they appear to explain the difference. 
 Outliers 
Even firms that report that ‗firms like theirs‘ have to pay bribes to get things done 
generally say that are equal to only a small amount relative to sales.  This means that outliers can 
have a large effect on averages.  Given that the average reported level of bribes is typically 
between about 2 and 5 percent of sales, a very small number of outliers—due to things such as 
enumerator error or innumerate managers—could have a large impact on the average.  Because 
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of this, most analyses omit or ‗winsorize‘ outliers when they calculate means or present medians 
rather than means so that a few outliers do not have a large impact on conclusions.
9
 
For the countries in this analysis, outliers appear to affect the averages for firms that 
report bribes as shares more than they affect the averages for firms that report bribes in local 
currency (see Table 3).   Except for Angola, where one firm that reports bribe payments in local 
currency is a large outlier, removing outliers does not affect the means for these firms.  In 
contrast, removing outliers does generally affect the means for firms that report bribes as a 
percent of sales.  Removing outliers therefore brings the means slightly closer together in most 
countries.  But the gap remains quite large. 
Outliers are therefore not the whole story.  Further evidence of this can be seen by 
looking at the entire distribution of responses for firms reporting in local currency and firms 
reporting as percentage of sales shows this clearly (see Figure 1).  Across the 15 countries (see 
Table 2), about 83 percent of firms reporting in local currency reported payments that were for 
less than 1 percent of sales.  Only 2 firms (less than one-half of one percent) reported payments 
Figure 1: The distribution of reported payments is very different for firms that reported bribes as shares of 
sales and firms that reported bribes in local currency 
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Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
Note: Figure shows the estimated distributions for the two samples: firms that report bribes as a percent of sales and firms that report bribes in 
terms of local currency.  The sample only includes firms that reported positive amounts and excludes outliers that reported amounts more than 
three standard deviations from the mean.  Graph is truncated at 13 percent of sales—after this both distributions are close to zero.  The distributions 
are estimated using an Epanechnilov kernel and estimating the optimal kernel to minimize the mean integrated squared error term (Silverman, 
1986). 
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of 10 percent or more of sales.  In comparison, only 8 percent of responses for firms reporting 
payments as a percent of sales were for less than 1 percent of sales and close to one-third 
reported amounts were 10 percent or more of sales.  Moreover, for firms reporting payments as a 
percent of sales, there were several peaks at discrete numbers—1 percent (16 percent of firms), 2 
percent (13 percent of firms), 5 percent (20 percent of firms), 10 percent (19 percent of firms), 20 
percent (4 percent) and 30 percent (1.5 percent).   
 Difficulty of answering questions about ‘firms like yours’ 
To compare bribes for firms that report bribes in monetary terms and firms that report 
bribes as a percent of sales, bribes must be divided by sales for firms that report them in 
monetary terms or multiplied by sales for firms that report them as a percent of sales.  Although 
it shouldn‘t be a serious concern, it is possible that this might affect results.  That is, whereas 
firms answer the question on bribes for a ‗firm like theirs‘, they provide sales for their actual 
firm.  As a result, the calculation is done dividing bribes for a ‗firm like theirs‘ by their firm‘s 
own sales.  It is plausible that if firms consistently compare themselves to firms that are bigger or 
smaller than themselves, that this could affect the calculation.   
Another possibility is that firms might be more comfortable answering sensitive 
questions as a percent of sales rather than in monetary terms and that this could affect averages.  
Iarossi (2006, p 50) notes that firms might prefer to answer questions on corruption when they 
can answer them in terms of ‗categories or percentages‘ and notes therefore that asking the 
question in these terms might improve response rates or accuracy of responses.   
This also does not appear to explain the discrepancy.  In addition to the questions on 
bribes, other questions also allow respondents to respond as either a percent of sales or as a 
monetary amount.  A similar pattern can be observed for these questions—firms that answered in 
monetary terms estimated amounts lower than firms that answered as a percent of sales for 
security costs, losses due to crime and losses due to power outages (see Figure 2).  The 
differences were smaller for security costs and losses due to crime, but remained statistically 
significant.  This suggests that the difference is not due to something specifically related to bribe 
payments such as the indirect phrasing or sensitivity of the question. 
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 Differences between firms answering as percent and firms answering as amounts 
Another possibility is that the firms that answer the questions as percentages might do so 
because they pay greater amounts as bribes.  That is, firms that pay only small amounts as bribes 
or believe that firms like theirs only pay small amounts might be more likely to answer the 
question as an amount than firms that pay larger amounts.  One possible reason for this might be 
that managers might find it difficult to answer the question as a percentage when the percentage 
is very small (e.g., less than one percent of sales).   
Cross-sectional evidence.  As a first step to seeing whether this appears to be the 
problem, we estimate the average treatment on the treated (ATT) using a treatment effects model 
based upon propensity score matching.  This estimation allows us to compare average bribe 
payments for firms reporting bribe payments as percentages with similar firms reporting bribe 
payments in local currency (i.e., while controlling for observable differences between the two 
types of firms).   
In the base model, the observable characteristics used to match firms through propensity 
score matching are size (log of number of employees) and sector (manufacturing, services, retail 
trade).  In an extended model, additional control variables are added—whether the firm keeps 
Figure 2: Firms that estimated losses due to crime, power outages and security in monetary terms also 
estimated lower amounts than firms that estimated losses as a percent of sales. 
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accounts that are audited by an external auditor, exports as a share of sales, whether the firm is 
foreign-owned, and whether the firm manager has a university-level education.
10
   
In other specifications, other observable characteristics are added to the propensity score 
model.  First, a set of variables are added to the base model representing interactions with 
regulatory authorities and infrastructure providers.  These are a set of dummy variables 
indicating whether the firm got a new telephone connection, a new power connection, a 
construction license, an import license, or an operating license in the previous two years and a 
continuous variable representing how much of their time senior management spend dealing with 
government regulations and required meetings.
11
  Gonzalez et al. (2007) show that these 
transactions (licenses and utility connections) are often associated with demands or expectation 
of bribes in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, using them to construct an index of graft.  
Second, a variable representing firm growth (average growth in employment over past three 
years) is included.  Fast growing firms might be particularly susceptible to bribe demands if they 
need extra permission to expand or if they are more profitable.
12
  This reduces sample size 
marginally since firms that are less than three years old are excluded.  Third, variables 
representing profitability (profit per worker) and capital intensity (capital per worker) are 
included.
13
  This reduces sample size more significantly—mostly because capital and profits are 
only available for manufacturing firms (about one half to two-thirds of the sample in most 
countries).  Finally all of these variables are included simultaneously. 
The results from this model strongly suggest differences between firms reporting in terms 
of percent of sales and firms reporting in terms of monetary amounts remain different after 
controlling for these observable differences (see Table 4).  The estimates suggest that in most 
countries, firms that reported amounts in monetary terms reported bribe payments between about 
4 and 7 percentage points lower than if they had reported payments in terms of percentage of 
sales. 
Are firms that report bribes in monetary terms less likely to pay bribes for specific 
transactions?  If firms that report bribes in monetary terms actually did pay less in bribes than 
firms that report them as a percent of sales, then it seems plausible that they might be less likely 
to pay bribes for specific transactions.  That is, firms that pay only small amounts as bribes or 
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believe that firms like theirs only pay small amounts might do so because they are less likely to 
pay bribes when they interact with regulators or utility company employees.  
The enterprise surveys ask firms whether bribes were requested or expected for a series 
of transactions—getting telecommunications, power and water connections and getting 
construction, import and operating licenses.  These questions were only asked to firms that 
reported that they had done these transactions in the past two years.  To see whether firms that 
reported bribes in monetary terms were less likely to report paying bribes for these transactions, 
we regress a dummy variable indicating the firm reported bribes in monetary terms and a series 
of enterprise-level characteristics on dummy variables indicating that they reported bribes were 
requested or expected for these transactions.  Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, 
we use a probit regression. 
The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that firm reports bribes in monetary 
terms is positive in all regressions and is statistically significant in three of the six (see Table 7).  
This suggests that firms that reported bribes in monetary terms were more, not less, likely to 
report bribes for most transactions.  The point estimates of the coefficients are large in some 
cases—firms that report bribes in local currency were between 5 and 23 percent more likely to 
report paying bribes for five of the six transactions.  For the final transaction—getting a water 
connection—they were about 63 percentage points more likely to do so.  This last regression, 
however, was based upon a relatively small number of transactions and so the coefficient is 
estimated imprecisely. 
In summary, firms that report bribes in monetary terms are more, not less, likely to report 
bribes for specific transactions.  This suggests that firms reporting bribes in monetary terms are 
not reporting lower amounts because they are less likely to pay bribes for specific transactions. 
Panel Evidence. The cross-sectional analysis controls for observed differences in terms of 
enterprise characteristics, enterprise performance, and interactions with regulatory agencies.  
Unobserved differences, however, might account for part of the difference.  To see if this is the 
case, we take an alternate approach using a panel of firms from Tanzania.
14
   
In the 2006/07 Enterprise Surveys, the surveys used in the previous section, firms were 
able to answer the question either as a percent of sales or in monetary terms.  In practice, most 
managers answered the question as a percent of sales.  In most of the earlier surveys, managers 
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were only given one option—answering the question as percent of sales.  This makes it difficult 
to make panel comparisons for the other two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with panel 
information (Kenya and Uganda) because most firms answered the question as a percent of sales 
in both years.   
But in one survey, the 2003 Enterprise Survey for Tanzania, firms were asked to answer 
the question in monetary terms.  Because some of the firms were re-interviewed in 2006, this 
means that it possible to make a small panel with most firms answering the question in terms of 
percent of sales in 2006 and in monetary terms in 2003.  Including fixed effects means that it is 
possible to control for unobserved firm effects in the analysis.  This makes it possible to see 
whether the same firms report higher bribes in 2006, when they mostly reported bribes as a 
percent of sales, than they did in 2003, when they had to report bribes in monetary terms.   
Firms reported paying higher bribes on average in 2006 than in 2003.  For the entire 
sample, including firms that reported not paying bribes, the average reported bribe payment was 
0.1 percent in 2003 and 2.7 percent in 2006.  For the panel firms, including firms that reported 
not paying bribes, the average reported payment was 0.1 percent in 2003 and 2.0 percent in 2006.  
The null hypothesis that the means are equal for the two samples is rejected at 1 percent level.
15
 
This does not seem to be because corruption increased between 2003 and 2006.  In fact, 
external evidence suggests that corruption fell over this period.  In the Worldwide Governance 
Indicator database, Tanzania improved from the 19
th
 percentile to the 43
rd
 percentile between 
2003 and 2006 (Kaufmann and others, 2007).  Internal evidence in the two surveys is also 
consistent with the idea that corruption has improved since 2003.  About 55 percent of firms said 
that corruption was a major or very severe problem in 2003 compared to about 25 percent in 
2006.
16
  Among the panel firms, about 58 percent of firms said that corruption was a major or 
very severe problem in 2003 compared to about 9 percent in 2006.
17
  
Although the mean level of bribes is very different, it is possible to do a more formal 
limited panel data analysis comparing the responses by firms in Tanzania in 2003 and 2006.  To 
do this, we run a simple regression of bribe payments in the two years on a series of fixed firm 
effects and a dummy indicating whether the interview was delivered in 2003 or 2006.   
In both years, significant numbers of firms report that they do not pay any bribes, 
meaning that the dependent variable is censored at zero.  Including fixed effects in models with 
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censored dependent variables results in two econometric problems.  The first problem is that if 
the firm did not report paying bribes in either 2003 or 2006, the coefficient on that firm‘s dummy 
will become infinitely negatively large when the model is estimated.  As a result, firms that did 
not report paying bribes in either period have to be discarded (Maddala, 1983, p. 325).
18
  
Similarly, only firms with observations in both periods can be included (i.e., if the firm must not 
have refused to answer in either period) or the dummy fully explains their payments.  This 
reduces sample size considerably—from the 62 firms with panel information to only 26 firms. 
A second problem is that fixed-effects maximum likelihood estimators can have an 
‗incidental parameters‘ problem when the number of cross-sectional units is large and the 
number of time periods is small (Neyman and Scott, 1948).  That is, fixed effect maximum 
likelihood estimators are generally inconsistent when the number of time periods is fixed (i.e., T 
has to become large for consistency).
19
  Because of these concerns, we estimate the model using 
a semi-parametric least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator proposed by Honore (1992), which 
is consistent and asymptotically normal even with only two years of data.
20
  This estimator is 
also more robust to distributional assumptions regarding the error term, remaining consistent in 
the presence of non-normal or heteroscedastic errors. 
Table 6 shows the results from the fixed effects estimation.  Although external evidence 
suggests that corruption fell in Tanzania between the two surveys, firms reported paying more in 
bribes in 2006 than they did in 2003 after including individual firm level fixed effects.   
Moreover, firms that reported bribes in monetary terms in both years do not appear to 
report higher bribes in 2006 than in 2003.  The coefficient on a dummy variable indicating that 
the firm reported bribes in monetary terms in 2006 is statistically significant and negative and is 
about the same size as the coefficient on the year dummy for 2006—suggesting that these firms 
reported similar bribes on average in the two years.   
These results are consistent with the previous results, suggesting that firms that report 
bribes in monetary terms report lower bribes than firms that report bribes as a percent of sales.  
Although it is difficult to include additional control variables because the matrix used in the 
estimation becomes non-invertible when too many variables are included, the coefficients remain 
statistically significant when controls for number of workers and percent of time senior 
management spends dealing with government regulations and inspections are included.
21
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IV. Conclusions 
Given that lying and non-responses are likely to bias estimates of bribe payments 
downwards, it might seem that the estimates from the Enterprise Surveys are likely, if anything, 
to underestimate the true cost of corruption.  That is, bribe payments to get things done with 
respect to licenses, taxes and other services might exceed 2.5 percent of average sales in many 
low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The results from this paper suggest that this might 
not be the case.   
Firm managers that report bribes as a percent of sales report that bribes are far higher 
than firm managers that report bribes in monetary terms (i.e., in local currency).  If managers that 
reported bribes as a percent of sales estimated the amounts by estimating payments in monetary 
terms and then dividing by firm sales, we would not expect to see much of a difference between 
the two.  That we do, suggests that managers do not do this kind of explicit calculation. 
So why do we find a difference?  It does not appear to be because of a few outliers and it 
does not appear to be something specifically related to the format or sensitivity of the question 
on corruption.  Moreover, it does not appear to be because the firms that report bribes as a 
percent of sales are different than firms that report bribes in monetary terms either in terms of 
their observable characteristics or in the probability that they pay bribes for specific transactions.  
The analysis of panel firms in Tanzania also suggests that it is not due to unobservable firm-level 
characteristics. 
So why is there a difference between the two amounts?  One possibility is that firms are 
more likely to answer the question honestly or accurately when allowed to answer as a percent of 
sales.  Iarossi (2006, p 50) notes that firms might prefer to answer questions on corruption when 
they can answer them in terms of ‗categories or percentages‘ and so asking the question in these 
terms might improve response rates or accuracy of responses.  Even if this were the case, 
however, it is not clear why this would result in a systematic downward bias for firms reporting 
bribes in monetary terms.  This also doesn‘t explain why less sensitive questions (e.g., on 
security costs or power outages) exhibit a similar pattern. 
Another possibility—and one that is more likely in the opinion of the author—is that firm 
managers might not be very good at estimating amounts in percentage terms.  This might be 
especially the case when the amounts are relatively small—as noted earlier most firms that 
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estimate amounts in monetary terms estimate amounts less than 1 percent of sales—and when the 
managers do not try to explicitly calculate percentages (e.g., by using calculators or pencil and 
paper).   
If this is the case, petty corruption might be far less costly than headline estimates would 
suggest.  For the 15 countries surveyed in 2006/07, the average firm that reported bribe payments 
in monetary terms reported payments that were between about 0.5 and 1.5 percent of sales 
compared to between 4 and 8 percent of sales for firms reporting as a percent of sales.  Since 
firms only estimated bribe payments in either way if they reported that bribe payments were 
needed, both numbers overestimates the actual burden of petty corruption in Africa.  Taking into 
account firms that report not paying bribes—but ignoring lying and non-responses in both 
cases—suggests that average bribes are probably closer to between 0.2 to 0.7 percent of sales 
when the estimates are based upon monetary amounts and between 2 and 5 percent of sales when 
are based upon share of sales (see Table 8).  
For cross-country comparisons, it is not clear how large an effect it will have on rankings.  
That is, to the extent that estimates for all countries are equally biased upwards or downwards, it 
shouldn‘t affect relative rankings.  Consistent with this, the estimate assuming that all firms 
reported in monetary terms is highly correlated at the country level with the estimate assuming 
all firms reported bribes as a percent of sales (simple correlation==0.82 and spearman rank 
correlation=0.79).   The estimates for low-income countries appear more biased than the 
estimates for middle-income countries, perhaps because managers are better educated or more 
numerate in middle-income countries.  But the difference in means is small. 
The discrepancy, however, might affect comparisons between the cost of petty corruption 
and the cost of other things, especially when amounts for other estimates are given in monetary 
terms (e.g., when they are taken from company accounts).  Under the first set of estimates, bribes 
appear to be more costly that either communication costs or transportation costs (excluding fuel) 
in most low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in some countries approach the cost of 
power and fuel.  Under the second set of estimates, they are far lower than any of these costs in 
most countries.  Although these are only the direct monetary cost of corruption—not the cost of 
other distortions associated with corruption—this suggests that petty corruption might be far less 
costly in most countries than the raw estimates would suggest. 
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So what are the lessons of this study?  Whatever the reason for the difference, it would 
seem important to better understand why there are differences in the estimates of bribes and the 
other measures.  Designing open-ended questions to better understand how firm managers 
answer these questions would therefore be useful.  Documenting things such as whether 
managers actually perform explicit calculations, whether they appear evasive, whether they are 
trying to push past this question quickly and other such issues, might also make it easier to 
understand why this is the case.  True randomized experiments asking some firms the question as 
a percent of sales and some as an amount would also be useful for confirming the results.   
It also suggests that the questions should be asked one way or the other.  Giving firms a 
choice could lead to bias in comparisons across countries when the percent of firms reporting in 
different ways differs across countries.  Given that it seems easier for managers to estimate 
bribes in monetary terms rather than as a percent of sales, it would seem to make sense to ask 
this particular question in this way rather than as a percent of sales.
22
   
Since other questions appear to have similar problems—although possibly to a lesser 
extent that the question on bribes—similar advice probably holds for other questions such as 
security costs.  When the amounts can be taken directly from a firms‘ books (e.g., security), it 
would probably be more natural to ask about them in monetary terms. For other questions such 
as losses due to power outages, where it might not be as natural to answer the question in 
monetary terms, it probably makes sense to ask different questions that allow researcher to assess 
the cost directly.  For example, it might be possible to ask more direct questions on number and 
length of outages, how many lost hours of production this resulted in, and how many hours were 
later made up by either extending work time or by increasing productivity at other times.  
Similarly, firms could also be directly asked about the cost of a generator and the cost of running 
the generator relative to the cost of power from the grid. 
 16 
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VI. Tables. 
Table 1: Cost of bribes for manufacturing firms relative to other costs 
 Bribes  
Communication 
Costs 
Transportation 
Costs 
Electricity 
and Fuel 
Costs 
Labor 
Costs 
As % of 
power 
costs 
As % of 
Labor Costs 
Low Income Countries        
   Guinea-Bissau 4.4% 0.3% 2.5% 5.8% 28.7% 75.9% 15.3% 
   Mauritania 4.4% 1.4% 1.7% 5.9% 14.9% 73.7% 29.3% 
   Guinea-Conakry 4.0% 0.8% 2.5% 5.9% 23.2% 67.7% 17.3% 
   Congo, DR 3.5% 0.8% 3.3% 4.2% 20.3% 82.7% 17.2% 
   Burundi 3.4% 1.2% 1.8% 4.4% 30.3% 75.9% 11.1% 
   Tanzania 2.9% 1.6% 1.8% 4.3% 20.3% 68.2% 14.5% 
   Gambia 2.9% 1.2% 3.8% 8.8% 22.1% 32.5% 13.0% 
   Uganda 2.8% 1.1% 2.8% 5.5% 23.5% 49.7% 11.7% 
   Kenya 2.3% 1.3% 1.4% 3.7% 15.9% 62.4% 14.7% 
   Ghana 1.7% 1.3% 3.3% 4.3% 30.9% 39.7% 5.6% 
   Rwanda 1.0% 1.2% 2.8% 5.5% 18.3% 18.9% 5.7% 
Middle Income Countries         
   Angola 3.2% 0.6% 1.2% 3.0% 34.8% 104.0% 9.1% 
   Botswana 1.1% 1.6% 2.3% 5.2% 20.3% 22.1% 5.7% 
   Swaziland 1.1% 1.0% 1.7% 4.7% 25.7% 23.1% 4.3% 
   Namibia 0.9% 1.3% 2.4% 4.9% 19.8% 18.1% 4.5% 
Note: Calculations are for manufacturing firms only and so differ from figures in Table 2, which include all firms.  The reason for 
this is that detailed cost breakdowns are only available for manufacturing firms. 
 
Table 2: Average payments as percent of sales for firms reporting bribes, by how bribes were reported  
 Obs. 
Percent 
paying 
bribes 
Average Payment (as % of sales) 
T-test that 
difference 
is not zero 
All 
Firms 
Firms reporting 
positive amount 
Firms 
reporting as 
% of sales 
Firms 
reporting as 
value 
Angola 398 46% 2.5 5.5 6.5 1.5 0.00 
Botswana 285 28% 0.8 3.8 4.4 0.5 0.00 
Burundi 260 56% 4.4 5.6 7.9 ---a --- 
Congo, DR 337 84% 3.7 4.8 5.9 0.6 0.00 
Gambia, The 140 52% 3.5 5.9 7.4 0.6 0.01 
Ghana 494 37% 1.6 4.0 5.0 1.3 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau 128 62% 2.8 4.8 6.6 0.1 0.00 
Guinea-Conakry 220 85% 4.1 6.9 5.8 0.7 0.00 
Kenya 646 79% 2.7 3.4 4.2 0.6 0.00 
Mauritania 207 82% 3.8 4.4 4.9 0.8 0.00 
Namibia 286 11% 0.3 3.2 3.4 0.2 0.02 
Rwanda 209 20% 2.1 9.5 11.3 ---a --- 
Swaziland 290 41% 1.2 3.3 3.0 ---a --- 
Tanzania 415 49% 2.7 5.4 6.8 0.5 0.00 
Uganda 508 51% 3.3 5.1 7.2 0.6 0.00 
Note: Firms that reported amounts that are greater or less than the average by more than three standard deviations are omitted from averages. 
a. Average not report because fewer than five firms in category.   
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Table 3: Winsorized, Trimmed and Actual Means for payments, by how bribes were reported. 
 All Observations 
Firms more than 3 standard 
deviations from mean dropped 
Top and bottom 5 percent 
winsorized 
 
Local 
Currency 
Share 
Local 
Currency 
Share 
Local 
Currency 
Share 
Angola 4.6 7.8 1.5 6.5 1.5 6.7 
Botswana 0.5 6.0 0.5 4.4 0.5 4.6 
Burundi ---a 8.2 ---a 7.9 ---a 8.1 
Congo, DR 0.6 7.5 0.6 5.9 0.6 6.0 
Gambia 0.6 9.2 0.6 7.4 0.6 7.9 
Ghana 1.3 6.3 1.3 5.0 1.3 5.2 
Guinea-Bissau 0.1 6.6 0.1 6.6 0.1 6.4 
Guinea-Conakry 0.7 6.7 0.7 5.8 0.7 5.8 
Kenya 0.6 5.7 0.6 4.2 0.6 4.3 
Mauritania 0.8 5.7 0.8 4.9 0.8 4.7 
Namibia 0.2 5.9 0.2 3.4 0.2 3.1 
Rwanda ---a 14.0 ---a 11.3 ---a 10.7 
Swaziland ---a 3.3 ---a 3.0 ---a 3.1 
Tanzania 0.5 8.7 0.5 6.8 0.5 7.5 
Uganda 0.6 8.0 0.6 7.2 0.6 7.1 
Note: Table only includes firms reporting positive amounts.  Columns (2) and (3) are averages for firms reporting positive amounts.  .  Columns 
(4) and (5)  drops firms that reported amounts that are greater or less than the average by more than three standard deviations are omitted from the 
mean.  .  Columns (6) and (7) winsorized the top and bottom 5 percent of observations (i.e., sets firms in the top and bottom five percent of 
observations to the level of the 5th and 95th percentile.  Winsorizing and trimming is done for the full sample not the sub-samples separately. 
a. Average not report because fewer than five firms in category.   
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Table 4: Average difference between firms reporting as amount and as percent based upon propensity scores 
 Base Extended 
Regulatory 
Variables 
Firm 
Growth 
Firm 
Performance 
All 
Angola -8.3*** -8.9** -9.1*** -9.9*** -6.9*** 
--- 
a
 
 (-3.60) (-3.25) (-2.85) (-3.27) (-3.32) 
Botswana -4.0*** -4.0*** -4.4*** -4.0** 
--- 
a
 --- 
a
 
 (-4.80) (-5.14) (-2.78) (-2.30) 
Congo, DR -5.8*** -5.7*** -5.9*** -6.3*** -5.5*** -6.1*** 
 (-16.77) (-12.92) (-10.37) (-11.20) (-7.69) (-4.86) 
Gambia -7.0*** -7.6*** -6.3 
--- 
a
 --- 
a
 --- 
a
 
 (-4.01) (-2.82) (-1.29) 
Ghana -5.4*** -5.2*** -5.0*** -5.5*** -4.7*** -5.8*** 
 (-6.03) (-6.01) (-3.08) (-5.05) (-2.87) (-2.81) 
Guinea-Bissau -6.5*** -6.7*** -4.0* -8.5*** 
--- 
a
 --- 
a
 
 (-6.54) (-6.44) (-1.65) (-4.41) 
Guinea-Conakry -5.2*** -5.2*** -3.9** -4.4*** -5.7** -3.3* 
 (-6.61) (-5.69) (-2.20) (-4.81) (-2.57) (-1.70) 
Kenya -3.7*** -3.7*** -3.8*** -3.6*** -3.3*** -3.9*** 
 (-12.56) (-14.38) (-11.48) (-11.24) (-9.14) (-3.59) 
Mauritania -4.1*** -3.5*** -4.0** -3.9*** -3.4 -1.3 
 (-7.24) (-3.58) (-1.93) (-3.56) (-1.08) (-1.26) 
Namibia -4.2** -4.4** 
--- 
a
 --- 
a
 --- 
a
 --- 
a
 
 (-2.27) (-2.08) 
Tanzania -7.1*** -6.7*** -8.2*** -7.1*** -5.9*** -5.7*** 
 (-9.22) (-7.55) (-5.93) (-9.34) (-4.38) (-2.83) 
Uganda -6.3*** -6.3*** -6.1*** -5.9*** -6.4*** -5.8*** 
 (-11.49) (-11.73) (-5.95) (-5.29) (-4.72) (-3.45) 
Note: The propensity score is estimated as a probit model including size and sector in the base model and including size, sector, whether the 
firm is foreign-owned, exports as percent of sales, whether the manager has a university education, and whether the firm has audited 
accounts in the extended model.   
Matching is done based upon propensity scores and firms are matched using a Gaussian kernel.  The model was estimated using STATA 
(Becker and Ichino, 2002).  T-statistics are estimated by bootstrapping the standard errors.  Models are only estimated over areas of common 
support.  Bootstrapped T-stats are in parentheses.  In Burundi, Rwanda and Swaziland, fewer than 5 firms reported bribes in US dollars in 
even the base model so these countries are omitted from the table 
*** ** * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
a 
Estimation of model fails due to too few observations.  The main problem is that when only a few firms report bribes in dollars, the probit 
model perfectly predicts method of reporting. 
 
Table 5: Control of Corruption in Tanzania (higher values mean less corruption)) 
Year 
Percentile Rank 
(0-100) 
Governance Score 
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
Standard Error 
1996 9.7 -1.09 0.25 
1998 12.6 -1.07 0.19 
2000 9.2 -1.07 0.19 
2002 14.6 -1.00 0.17 
2003 18.9 -0.88 0.16 
2004 30.6 -0.65 0.15 
2005 29.1 -0.73 0.15 
2006 43.2 -0.37 0.15 
Source: Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) 
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Table 6: Differences in bribe payments for panel firms in Tanzania between 2003 and 2006. 
Estimation Method Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) 
Dependent Variable Bribes as percent of sales 
Number of Firms  26 26 26 
Year -- 2006 14.74 14.78 16.99 
(dummy) (4.77)*** (5.38)*** (4.90)*** 
Answered question in monetary terms in 2006 -13.78 -14.04 -20.09 
(dummy) (-4.46)*** (-3.10)*** (-3.08)*** 
Number of Workers  -0.67  
(natural log)  (-0.05)  
% of management time spent dealing with government regulation   0.23 
(percent)   (1.13) 
*** ** * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
Table 7: Probability that firms that report bribes in local currency pay bribes for various transactions 
 Probit 
 Dummy Variable Indicating firm had to pay bribe when getting: 
 
Telephone 
Connection 
Power 
Connection 
Water 
Connection 
Construction 
License 
Import 
License 
Operating 
License 
Observations 492 453 109 227 335 1042 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm reported bribes in monetary terms 0.049 0.233*** 0.631*** 0.110 0.078 0.177*** 
 (0.78) (3.14) (3.55) (1.07) (0.76) (3.85) 
Workers 0.002 0.021 -0.015 -0.045 -0.018 0.006 
 (0.095) (0.77) (-0.27) (-1.11) (-0.63) (0.37) 
Export Share 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.003** 
 (0.62) (-0.20) (-1.03) (0.19) (-0.64) (-2.34) 
Foreign-owned 0.090 0.064 0.025 -0.102 -0.028 0.016 
 (1.20) (0.76) (0.15) (-1.03) (-0.38) (0.30) 
University-Education Manager -0.050 -0.025 0.127 0.066 0.096 -0.009 
 (-1.15) (-0.46) (1.03) (0.79) (1.52) (-0.26) 
Pseudo-R-Squared 0.07 0.10 0.21 0.08 0.14 0.11 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effect for continuous variables and are differences in probabilities for discrete variables. 
*** ** * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 8: Actual average bribe payments and estimated bribe payments if all firms reported bribes in either 
monetary terms or shares 
 Average (all) 
Estimated 
(monetary) 
Estimated 
(shares) 
Monetary estimate 
(as % of shares estimate) 
Low Income (average) 3.0 0.4 3.5 12% 
   Ghana 1.3 0.3 1.5 19% 
   Kenya 2.3 0.3 2.6 11% 
   Tanzania 2.8 0.2 3.2 7% 
   Uganda 3.1 0.5 3.2 14% 
   Congo, DR 3.7 0.6 5.0 13% 
   Mauritania 3.7 0.4 4.0 9% 
   Guinea-Conakry 4.3 0.7 4.8 15% 
Middle Income (average) 1.2 0.3 1.5 18% 
   Namibia 0.4 0.0 0.4 10% 
   Botswana 0.9 0.1 1.2 12% 
   Angola 2.4 0.6 2.8 21% 
Memo: Small Countries     
   Gambia 3.5 0.3 3.8 8% 
   Guinea-Bissau 3.0 0.1 4.4 1% 
Note: Estimated values are calculated as follows.  First, for the firms that reported positive bribe payments fitted values are calculated from a 
regression of estimated bribe payments on the variables in the extended model with the regulatory variables included (see Table 4), a series of 
country dummies, and a series of country specific variables indicating whether the firm estimated payments in monetary terms or as a percent of 
sales.  The country specific variables indicating whether the firm estimated payments in monetary terms are set to zero for all observations to get 
a estimated share for monetary terms and set to one for all firms in the country to get the estimated share for share terms.  For firms that report not 
paying bribes the fitted values are set to zero for each firm.  The averages are then calculated over all observations in each country for each fitted 
value.  The average across countries is a simple unweighted average.  Since the estimates for the two small countries with less than 200 firm 
observations appear to be outliers, these are omitted from the averages.   
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1
 Detailed cost breakdowns are only available for manufacturing firms and so comparisons are for only these firms.  As a result, 
numbers in Table 1, which are only for manufacturing firms are different from figures in Table 2, which are for all firms. 
2
 See, for example, Fisman and  Svensson (2007) for a study using firm-level data on the distortions related to 
corruption. 
3
 Some studies have found, however, that perceptions appear to line up fairly well with objective indicators of the 
investment climate.  See, for example, Gelb et al (2006) for work using data from Africa or Hellman and others 
(1999) for work using data from Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  However, other studies have found that measures 
based upon perceptions might be affect by things such as political freedom.  Jensen et al (2008) show that non-
response patterns and lying reduce measured corruption in politically repressive environments.  Similar patterns also 
appear for less sensitive questions.  In particular, Clarke et al (2006) show that firms appear to complain more about 
access to finance in countries that are more free politically than in other countries after controlling for other country 
and firm characteristics.   
4
 See, for example, the discussion in Iarossi (2006) or Recanatini and others (2000) for discussions of phrasing 
questions related to corruption. 
5
 In the question firm managers that reported applying for utility connections and licenses were asked whether ‗a gift 
or informal payment was expected or requested‘ not whether a bribe was paid.  Thus, they can admit that a bribe was 
requested without actually admitting whether it was paid.  Iarossi (2006) also notes that respondents also appear to 
be more willing to answer questions on sensitive issues when the question is long—something the question on 
Enterprise Surveys questionnaire appears to fulfill.  Azfar and Murrell (forthcoming) argue that even broad 
questions about corruption, including questions about ‗firm like yours‘, suffer from serious problems with lying and 
non-response. 
6
 The non-response rate to this question on the enterprise surveys can be quite high.  Although in the 2006/07 World 
Bank Enterprise Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa, the non-response rate was close to 6 percent, in earlier World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, the non-response rate was even higher—for example, about 14 percent in the 2003 Enterprise 
Survey conducted in Tanzania, 23 percent in the 2003 Enterprise Survey conducted in Kenya, and 49 percent in the 
2003 Enterprise Survey in Uganda.  Although it is not possible to know what firms that refuse to answer would have 
said, it seems plausible that firms that pay bribes (i.e., that are breaking the law or engaging in socially unacceptable 
behavior) will be more likely to refuse to answer than firms that do not.  Azfar and Murrell (forthcoming) show 
results consistent with this.  As a result, non-responses are likely to bias results downwards.  Another problem, 
lying, is also likely to bias results downward.  Firms that do pay bribes—or suspect that firms that are like theirs 
do— would appear more likely to say they don‘t than firms that don‘t pay bribes will be to say they do.  That is, 
since paying bribes is illegal, it seems likely that the firms that are paying bribes are most likely to lie.  Even if they 
don‘t pay bribes but suspect that many ‗firms like theirs‘ do, it seems possible that they might lie since they 
probably suspect that the interviewer will interpret a ‗yes‘ to a question about whether firms like theirs pay bribes as 
indicating that they themselves do.  Consistent with this concern, when managers do say that firms like theirs pay 
bribes during interviews, they often explicitly note that their company does not do so.   
7
 They do this by using a series of randomized questions to identify firm managers who give a set of answers that are 
very unlikely and show that these managers admit to corrupt interactions far less than other managers do. 
8
 Firms that report paying no bribes are excluded from these averages since it is not clear whether they would have 
reported bribes as a percent or in monetary terms. 
9
 On the World Bank‘s Enterprise Surveys website (www.enterprisesurveys.org) averages for most firm-level 
variables other than averages of dummies are calculated omitting firms that report amounts that are over three 
standard deviations from the mean.  Similarly, using a sample of firms from Uganda, Svensson (2003) excludes two 
outliers in the analysis in that paper.  
10
 See footnote 8 for a description of how firms not reporting bribes are treated 
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11
 An additional question on whether the firm got a water connection was omitted because this was not asked in 
most countries and so would restrict sample size significantly.  Several analyses have shown that corruption is 
greater in countries where the burden of regulation is heavier (Djankov and others, 2002; World Bank, 2003).  At 
the enterprise level, Safavian et al.  (2001) show that firms in Russia that face more inspections are more likely to 
say that corruption is a problem.     
12
 Safavian et al.  (2001) find that firms in Russia that were growing more quickly are more likely to say that 
corruption is a problem than slower growing firms.  Clarke and Xu (2004), however, do not find a statistically 
significant relationship between sales growth and bribe payments for sample of countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. 
13
 Svensson (2003) shows that firms that are more profitable and firms that are more capital intensive pay more in 
bribes in Uganda.  Clarke and Xu (2004) also find that firms that are more profitable pay higher bribes in a sample 
of countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.   
14
 The panel data are described in detail in Regional Program on Enterprise Development (2007) 
15
 The t-statistic is 3.17 (p-value=0.00). 
16
 Comparisons are for manufacturing firms only since the 2003 survey only covered manufacturing firms. 
17
 In practice, this might underestimate the actual burden of corruption in 2006.  A major electricity crisis in 2006 
appears to have affected firms responses to perception-based questions.  That is, complaints about every area of the 
investment climate except power were far more muted in the 2006 survey than they were in the 2003 survey 
(Regional Program on Enterprise Development, 2007). 
18
 When the model is estimated after these observations are dropped, the estimator is called an ―unconditional 
estimator‖.  Heckman and Macurdy (1980) propose (in a slightly different Tobit-type model) an estimator that 
explicitly takes into account the conditioning that arises from discarding these observations (the conditional 
estimator).  They note that since the two estimators require the same asymptotic assumptions for consistency, there 
is no theoretical reason to prefer the conditional estimator to the unconditional estimator (p. 59).  Therefore, we 
present results from the unconditional model since it is significantly easier to estimate. 
19
 This suggests that including fixed effects might be problematic in this instance—since there are only two years of 
data in the current dataset.  But as Greene (2004a; 2004b) points out, there are no general results showing that 
maximum likelihood estimators are biased when T is small.  Further, recent Monte-Carlo studies suggests that the 
slope coefficients for fixed effects Tobit estimators do not appear to be biased even for models with very few time 
periods (Greene, 2004a; Greene, 2004b).  This is in sharp contrast to other fixed effect maximum likelihood 
estimators, such as fixed effects Probit estimators, where the coefficients exhibit substantial bias for small T.  
However, the estimates of the disturbance variance do appear to be biased downwards (about 36 percent too small 
when T=2 in Greene‘s analysis).  This make the t-statistics appear larger than they would be and means that 
estimates of marginal effects that use mean values for calculations will be biased. 
20
 The model is estimated in GAUSS using the PANTOB package written by Bo Honore.  The program is available 
on Bo Honore‘s website (http://www.princeton.edu/~honore/).  
21
 In particular, it becomes non-invertible when dummies for exporters, foreign-owned firms, or exports as a percent 
of sales are included.  It also become non-invertible when number of workers and % of management time spend 
dealing with government regulations are included at the same time. 
22
 Another exception might be bribes that are used to win a government contract—this might be more naturally 
asked as a markup rather than an absolute amount if managers naturally think of it in this way.   
